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This paper offers an explication of the hump-shaped response of real economic activity to changes
in monetary policy, focusing on the particular channel operating through new home sales.  I suggest
that the conventional notion of a monetary policy shock as a surprise change in the fed funds rate is
misspecified.  The primary news for market participants is not what the Fed just did, but is instead
new information about what the Fed is going to do in the near future.  Revisions in these anticipations
show up instantaneously in long-term mortgage rates.  Although mortgage rates respond well before
the Fed actually changes its target rate, home sales do not respond until much later.  The paper attributes
this delay to cross-sectional heterogeneity in search times.  This framework offers a description of
the lags in the effects of monetary policy that is both more detailed, allowing us in principle to measure
the consequences at the daily frequency, and more believable than traditional measures.
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H o wd ow em e a s u r et h ee ﬀects of monetary policy on the economy? One popular approach
(e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999) is based on a structural VAR. Let ym
denote a vector of variables observed for month m of which the average fed funds rate over
the month, rm, is one element. Suppose we formed a linear forecast of ym+s based on lagged
values of y (denoted Ωm−1) and some subset of the current values of y (denoted Λm). How
would news about the value of rm, denoted um, cause us to revise our expectation of ym+s?




Much of the discussion in the literature concerns which elements of ym to include in the
contemporaneous information set Λm. However, this choice often proves of limited conse-
quence. Figure 1 displays impulse-response functions for a fairly standard VAR including
industrial production, the CPI, commodity prices, the fed funds rate, and M2.2 One
sees the same broad hump-shaped response, with an increase in the fed funds rate being
followed after a substantial delay by a slowdown in industrial production, regardless of the
speciﬁcation of Λm.
Although the choice of Λm makes little diﬀerence for the answer to this forecasting
1 Here Ωm−1 = {ym−1,ym−2,...} and um = rm − ˆ E(rm|Λm,Ωm−1). See for example Hamilton (1994,
eqs. [11.4.19] and [11.6.16]).
2 The commodity price index is the Reuters/CRB index from http://www.crbtrader.com/crbindex/. All
other series were obtained from the St. Louis FRED database. The ﬁrst four series were converted to 100
times the year-over-year logarithmic change. The sample period is 1961:01 to 2008:03, and 12 lags were
used.
1question, the speciﬁcation of the lagged information set Ωm−1 is quite signiﬁcant, as stressed
by Rudebusch (1998) and Brissimis and Magginas (2006). The top panel of Figure 2 plots
the errors um associated with a monthly VAR (in which the fed funds rate is ordered last)
between 2003:01 and 2006:06. The second panel plots the diﬀerence between rm and the
forecast implied by the 1-month fed funds futures contract on the last day of month m − 1.
Over this period, changes in the fed funds rate that would be characterized by the VAR as
monetary policy shocks were in fact almost perfectly anticipated by market participants.
This is not to say that there were no surprises in monetary policy over this period.
However, any surprises were not about what the Fed just did, but instead reﬂected new
information about what the Fed was going to do in the future. The bottom panel plots
revisions during each month in the anticipation of what the fed funds rate was going to be
2 months after the indicated month. For example, what the VAR classiﬁes as a surprisingly
high fed funds rate in July 2004 actually showed up as news to markets in a much more
modest adjustment in the July fed funds contract price between April 30 and May 31. This
paper presents evidence that, for purposes of determining long-term mortgage rates or new
home sales, only unanticipated monetary policy changes matter, that is, it is the bottom
panels rather than the top panel in Figure 2 that will aﬀect the economy
Before proposing my alternative to the forecasting question posed by (1), let me clarify
what it is that I believe we’re trying to estimate. The primary input the Fed needs from
empirical researchers is an answer to questions like the following:
We’re trying to decide between a funds rate of 5 or 5.25. How would the
2predicted path for ym+s be diﬀerent under the two choices?
This question is potentially related to the impulse-response function in (1), in that both
represent questions about a conditional forecast. However, interpreting an object like (1)
as telling us the answer to the policy question of interest faces two challenges. First, for
purposes of the policy question, it is clear that the information set we’d like to use is all
the information available to the Fed prior to the decision. That suggests that the bottom
panels of Figure 2 are more promising measures than the top, and indeed ideally we would
want to use forecasts from the day before rather than a month before the Fed’s decision.
The second challenge is whether the conditions that caused surprise movements in rm in
our sample are comparable to those that would govern the outcome of the policy question
currently contemplated. For example, if historically the Fed raised rm in response to new
inﬂation fears that month, to what extent is what we see happen to ym+s ar e s u l to ft h e
inﬂation itself, and to what extent does it result from the choice made by the Fed?
A number of papers have sought to resolve these problems by looking at the change in
expectations of the fed funds rate on the day of a Fed policy change or announcement itself,
supposing that on such days, the answer to the forecasting question might isolate the eﬀect
of policy alone. Such studies include Kuttner (2001), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002), Faust,
Swanson and Wright (2004), Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005a,b), and Andersson,
Dillén, and Sillin (2006), among others. All of the above papers simply assume that the
conditional forecasting question has a diﬀerent answer on these days relative to others. To
my knowledge, mine is the ﬁrst paper to test this assumption, and I ﬁnd that over the period
31988-2006, it appears not to be the case. That ﬁnding opens up a vastly bigger and richer
data set than previous researchers have used for purposes of calculating how revisions of
forecasts of the fed funds rate are associated with revisions of the forecasts of other macro
variables of interest.
Ia l s od i ﬀer from most previous studies in making primary use of daily innovations in
the one- and two-month-ahead futures contracts rather than the spot-month contract. As
suggested in the second and third panels of Figure 2, the most important news about the Fed
in recent years has been information about what it is going to do rather than information
about what it just did. Poole and Rasche (2000), Gürkaynak (2005), and Gürkaynak, Sack,
and Swanson (2007) looked at the comovements between near-month contracts (rather than
spot-month contracts) and asset prices on policy days. But the current paper is again I
believe the ﬁrst to try to link changes in these contracts directly to subsequent changes in a
measure of real economic activity.
The way in which I do so is also methodologically novel. I propose a new method for
combining data observed at diﬀerent frequencies based on parametric restrictions inspired
by the observed cross-sectional heterogeneity in search times.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews evidence on the time-series
properties of daily changes in near-term fed funds futures prices, and concludes that these
changes primarily result from daily changes in a rational anticipation of what the Fed is going
to do next. Section 3 documents that weekly mortgage rates follow a near-martingale, and
relates its innovations to daily changes in fed funds futures. I document that this relation
4appears to be invariant with respect to which day of the week one uses, whether one uses only
those changes associated with policy announcement days, days of particular macroeconomic
news releases, or the level of time aggregation up to a month. Section 4 investigates the
forecasting relation between interest rates and the level of new home sales, documenting
that there is a very long, sustained lag. Some of the sales for a given month depend on
mortgage rate changes that occurred during the previous month, while sales of other homes
within that same month appear to be responding to mortgage rates up to six months earlier.
The paper attributes this lag in part to heterogeneity across households. The mean lag
of the time-series relation turns out to match closely the mean lag of the cross-sectional
distribution across diﬀerent households in the time spent searching before buying a home.
Taken together, the evidence supports the following interpretation of the way in which
monetary policy aﬀects the economy. Current mortgage rates reﬂect a rational anticipation
of everything the Fed may do in the future. If the Fed wants to change mortgage rates,
it has to do something other than what the market expected. Any new information about
what the Fed is going to do shows up essentially instantly in mortgage rates, but due to
heterogeneity across households in information—processing and search times, shows up only
gradually over time in new home sales. The biggest eﬀe c to nh o m es a l e si so b s e r v e d1 5
weeks after the change in policy is ﬁrst perceived by futures markets.
52 Anticipations of the fed funds rate.
2.1 Fed funds futures data.
The fed funds rate for month m,d e n o t e drm, is typically measured as the average value of
the eﬀective fed funds rate over all the days of that month. Since October 1988, it has been
possible on any business day to buy or sell through the Chicago Board of Trade a futures
contract whose payoﬀ depends on what the value of rm turns out to be. A contract on
day d for the current month speciﬁes a futures price or interest rate, denoted F1(d),s u c h
that if the current month’s fed funds rate (denoted rm∗(d)) turns out to be less than F1(d),
the seller of the contract will have to compensate the buyer an amount that depends on the
diﬀerence F1(d) − rm∗(d).I f rm∗(d) >F 1(d), the buyer will pay the seller. One can also
buy a contract for the following month, whose implied interest rate is denoted F2(d).F o r
example, one could purchase on d = May 22, 2006 a contract specifying F2(d) = 503 basis
points (a 5.03% annual interest rate). The actual interest rate for June turned out to be
r1+m∗(d) = 500.5 basis points, so the buyer of that one-month-ahead contract made a slight
proﬁt. One could also purchase a 2-month-ahead contract at rate F3(d), which if purchased
on May 22 would be a bet about the July value for rm. Longer-term contracts can also be
traded, though many a bit thinly in the early part of the sample, and this study will focus
on only the very near-term contracts.
The basic data used in this study are the daily changes (in basis points) of each day’s
settlement futures prices over the period October 3, 1988 to June 30, 2006.3 Let f1(d)
3 Data were purchased from the Chicago Board of Trade.





F1(d) − F1(d − 1) if m∗(d)=m∗(d − 1)
F1(d) − F2(d − 1) otherwise
.
Thus a positive value for f1(d) might be taken as a signal that investors received some
information during day d leading them to anticipate a higher value for rm∗(d) than they had
previously expected. Likewise let f2(d) denote F2(d) − F2(d − 1) for a typical day (and
f2(d)=F2(d)−F3(d− 1) if d is the ﬁrst day of the month) while f3(d)=F3(d)−F4(d −1)
if d is the ﬁrst day of the month and f3(d)=F3(d) − F3(d − 1) otherwise.
Standard ﬁnance theory states that the futures prices should satisfy
Ed[λj(d)Fj(d)] = Ed[λj(d)rm∗(d)+1−j]
for Ed[] the expectation based on all information available at the end of day d and λj(d) the
pricing kernel relating day d to the ﬁrst day of the next jth month. As noted by Hamilton
(forthcoming), the pricing kernel λj(d) is in units of a few month’s interest factor, and as
the time horizon becomes shorter, its mean approaches unity and variance goes to zero. For
this reason, daily changes in the prices of the very near-term futures contracts might be
expected to be dominated by new information about interest rates,
fj(d) ' Ed(rm∗(d)+1−j) − Ed−1(rm∗(d)+1−j) (2)
with the approximation exact in the special case of risk neutrality.
My forthcoming paper examined some of the empirical evidence in support of (2). Al-
though most previous researchers such as Sack (2004) and Piazzesi and Swanson (forthcom-
7ing) have found4 a statistically signiﬁcant negative mean for fi(d), this is strongly inﬂuenced
by a few big interest rate drops that caught the market by surprise. Maximum likelihood
estimation of the population mean of fi(d) that allows for EGARCH and calendar-based
heteroskedasticity along with a non-Normal distribution ends up implying a positive (and
far from statistically signiﬁcant) rather than a negative value for the mean.
My earlier analysis did ﬁnd some statistically signiﬁcant serial correlation in fi(d),b u t
this seems to be of very limited economic signiﬁcance. The one-day-ahead R2 from these
autoregressions is below 0.03 and the forecastability more than one day ahead is essentially
zero.
Piazzesi and Swanson (forthcoming) proposed a number of interest rate spreads that seem
to help predict longer-horizon monthly fed funds futures pricing errors. My analysis of daily
data (Hamilton, forthcoming) found that the previous day’s values for these spreads were
generally of very limited use for trying to predict fi(d) for i = 1,2, or 3. That paper also
conﬁrmed Piazzesi and Swanson’s ﬁnding that the monthly nonfarm payroll does seem to
make a statistically signiﬁcant contribution for predicting f2 (d) and f3(d), though the R2 of
this regression is only 2%. The results that will be reported below turn out to be unaﬀected
by whether or not these numbers are included as conditioning variables. I also found a
statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst lag fi(d−1) in a 5-day autoregression. However,
4 Most previous studies have looked at monthly forecast errors such as rm −F2(d†(m−1)) for d†(m) the
last day of month m. Since I’m using settlement prices, F1(d†(m)) = rm and
P
d∈A(m) f1(d) is identically
equal to rm −F2(d†(m −1)) for A(m) the set of all days that fall within month m. Thus the sample mean
of f1(d) is based on exactly the same statistic (namely, the sum of all f1(d)) a si st h es a m p l em e a no f
rm − F2(d†(m − 1)).
8this coeﬃcient is only 0.15, implying again a tiny R2 and virtually zero predictability more
than one day in advance.
Furthermore, as documented more fully by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2007), among
others, the near-term futures contracts oﬀer excellent forecasts of the actual fed funds rate.
For example, let d†(m) denote the last business day of month m. For the full sample of
data studied here, the forecast errors associated with one-month-ahead futures contracts
rm −F2(d†(m−1)) have an average squared value of 128 basis points, which is only a third
of the average squared change in the funds rate itself (rm − rm−1). The mean squared
errors for two-month-ahead contracts rm − F3(d†(m − 2)) and three-month-ahead contracts
rm −F4(d†(m −3)) have comparable improvements (69% and 64%, respectively) relative to
the forecast errors assuming no change (rm − rm−2 and rm − rm−3, respectively).
In more recent years, the futures prices have become quite astounding in the accuracy of
their predictions. For data over 2003:01 through 2006:06, they oﬀer 97% improvements in
mean squared error for purposes of predicting the fed funds rate relative to a random walk.
I conclude that while one can ﬁnd some statistical evidence of predictability of fi(d),a n y
daily ﬂuctuations in the implicit risk premium could at most account for a very small part
of the variance of fi(d). Instead, daily changes in fi(d) primarily reﬂect changes in market
participants’ assessments of where the federal funds rate is likely to be over the next few
months. Particularly in recent years, markets to a very good job in making this assessment.
92.2 Summarizing new information about Fed policy.
The data described above register three conceptually diﬀerent things that the market may
have learned on day d about the near-term course of Fed policy. The news on day d may
have warranted a revision in the expectation of the fed funds rate for the current month
(f1(d)), the following month (f2(d)) or the month after that (f3(d)). Of course, these 3
variables are far from independent— the correlation between f2(d) and f3(d), for example, is
0.90. Thus, while one could in principle ask what would happen if f2(d) were to increase
with f3(d) constant, in practice such a thought experiment is quite dissimilar to what has
typically been experienced. On the other hand, the variable f3(d)−f2(d) has a correlation of
only 0.13 with f2(d), so it is quite natural to regard f2(d) and (f3(d)−f2(d)) as two separate,
largely uncorrelated shocks. I have for this reason found it instructive to summarize changes
in market expectations about near-term monetary policy in terms of the level, slope, and




The ﬁtted values of a regression on (f1(d),f 2(d),f 3(d))0 are of course numerically identical
to those for a regression on (`(d),s(d),c(d))0, and the coordinate system in which results
are reported below is simply a rotation of corresponding results that could be expressed in
terms of the original fi(d). Where these regressions diﬀer is in the nature of the partial
10derivative questions to which individual regression coeﬃcients represent the answer. In a
regression on (`(d),s(d),c(d))0, the coeﬃcient on `(d) is telling us what would happen if `(d)
were to increase with s(d) and c(d) were constant, in other words, the coeﬃcient on the level
`(d) is the answer to the question, what would happen if the market’s expectation of the
fed funds rate for the current month, the following month, and the month after that were
all to increase together by 1 basis point.5 The coeﬃcient on the slope s(d) indicates the
consequences if we were told that the fed funds rate is going to be rising by 1 basis point per
month for each of the following two months. Finally, the curvature c(d) tells us what would
happen if the fed funds rate is expected to increase at a faster rate between next month and
the following relative to the increase between this month and next.
3M o r t g a g e r a t e s .
3.1 Data description.
A survey of U.S. national average mortgage rates is reported weekly by the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and available from FRED, the databank of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. These data were released on Fridays from April 2,
1971 to January 2, 2004, and have been released on Thursdays since January 8, 2004. The
empirical estimates in this section are all based on the weekly change in this series measured
in basis points, denoted ∆Rw, for the period since fed funds futures have been traded.
5 Selecting f2(d) as the basis for the level rather than f1(d) is warranted by the fact that it is closer to
being a factor for (f1(d),f 2(d),f 3(d))0 than is f1(d), and also tends to have a stronger correlation with other
macro variables of interest than does f1(d). For these reasons, f2(d) is a more logical candidate to represent
the overall level of the near-term fed funds term structure than is f1(d).
113.2 Martingale approximation.
The appendix reviews why a 30-year ﬁxed mortgage rate, when sampled at very high fre-
quencies, should approximately follow a martingale. We indeed ﬁnd very little empirical
predictability in changes in the weekly series. In a regression of the 922 observations from









∆Rw−3 +ˆ ew, (3)
the constant is statistically insigniﬁcant while the coeﬃcients on lags 1 and 3 are statistically
signiﬁcant. The magnitude of this serial correlation is quite small; the R2 of the above
regression is only 0.02. We will nevertheless retain the constant term and 3 lags as a base
case for all the other regressions reported in this paper.
There does not seem to be any evidence of further predictability in this series beyond this
very modest serial correlation, as detailed in Table 1. Weekly or monthly lags of mortgage
rates have no predictive power, nor do any of the variables proposed by Piazzesi and Swanson
(forthcoming) to predict fed funds futures.6 The R2 of each of the 9 regressions summarized
in Table 1 is still only 0.02. I conclude that treating daily values of the mortgage rate as a
martingale is an excellent approximation that appears to be quite consistent with the data.
6 For yield spreads, this was based on the value of the relevant interest rates that would have been known
3 days prior to the release day for week w − 1. For example, for week w = June 29, 2006, the previous
week’s reporting day was Thursday, June 22, so the interest rates used are for the ﬁrst business day prior to
Monday, June 19, which was Friday, June 16. The reason for lagging interest rates by 4 days in this way
will be explained shortly.
123.3 Comovement with fed funds futures.
Under the martingale hypothesis, daily changes (or, more generally, daily innovations) in
the mortgage rate are driven by previously unavailable information about interest rates and
discount factors. One component of this news must include revised expectations about
w h a tt h eF e di sg o i n gt od oo v e rt h ev e r yn e a rf u t u r e . F o rt h et i m eb e i n g ,w ew i l ld r a w
no distinction between news about the Fed itself and news about the economy to which
both the Fed and mortgage rates may be responding. Instead, we focus on the following
conditional forecasting question: suppose some news arrives on day d that causes us to revise
our predictions of what the Fed is going to do over the near future. How would we revise
our expectation of the mortgage rate in response to that news? If daily data were available,
we could ﬁnd the answer to that forecasting question by estimating the values of θj in the
following regression:
R(d) − R(d − 1)=θ1`(d)+θ2s(d)+θ3c(d)+e(d) (4)
where e(d) and each of the regressors would be expected to be approximate martingale
diﬀerence sequences.
Expression (4) further implies that if we performed a regression of the change in mortgage
rates over a small interval of q days on news about the Fed’s plans that arrived over each of
the intervening days,









β3jc(d − j)+ε(d) (5)
we should ﬁnd βij = θi for i = 1,2,3 and j = 1,2,...,q where {ε(d),ε(d − q),ε(d − 2q),...}
13would again be a martingale diﬀerence sequence since ε(d)=e(d)+e(d−1)+···+e(d−q+1).
Consider, then, a regression of the weekly change in mortgage rates on daily innovations
in the level, slope, and curvature of fed funds futures prices. Let `w1 denote the change in the
level of the fed funds futures on the day on which the week w mortgage rate would normally
be released, if the Chicago Board of Trade was open on that day, while `w1 is deﬁned to be
zero if the Chicago Board of Trade was closed on that day. Thus prior to 2004, `w1 is based
on the change on Friday for a fed funds contract settled in the following month, while `w1
would represent a Thursday change for weeks w since 2004. Let `w2 denote the change on
the preceding day (namely, Thursdays prior to 2004, Wednesdays since) if data are available
for that day and zero otherwise. Thus (`w1,` w2,...,`w,13)0 collects all the changes in the
month-ahead fed futures for the 13 most recent usual business days prior to and including
the usual release day. Collect changes in the slope and curvature in analogous vectors
(sw1,s w2,...,sw,13)0 and (cw1,c w2,...,cw,13)0.
Figure 3 plots the coeﬃcients and 95% conﬁdence intervals on changes in level, slope,
and curvature in the regression







β1j`wj + β2jswj + β3jcwj
¢
+ εw. (6)
For example, the top panel plots β1j as a function of j. It is quite striking that there are
no eﬀects of changes in fed funds futures on mortgage rates for the ﬁrst 3 days.
In the current system in which the weekly mortgage data are released on a Thursday,
Freddie Mac oﬃcials tell me they stop collecting numbers on Wednesday, and that most of
the reports from individual banks come in on Monday or Tuesday. For a quote from an
14individual bank that Freddie Mac receives on Monday, it would be physically impossible
for the unpredicted movements in fed funds futures on Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday
(which in turn are reﬂected in the values of `wj,s wj, and cwj for j =3 ,2, and 1, respectively)
to have any eﬀect on the reported mortgage. Moreover, banks that do report on Tuesday
could well be submitting a rate that was set on Monday, in which case `w3 would again not
aﬀect the value of Rw.
Although there are doubtless some diﬀerences in the speciﬁc day and nature of the
number that diﬀerent sources report to Freddie Mac, it is interesting to consider what we
would expect to ﬁnd in (6) if we considered Rw to be a uniform value determined on Monday
(that is, the day corresponding to `w4), and if the framework proposed in (5) were valid. In
that case, we would predict that (1) the coeﬃcients on βij should all be zero for j ∈ {1,2,3},
since these reﬂect information that came in after the time at which Rw was set; (2) the
coeﬃcients on βij should also be zero for j ∈ {9,10,11,12,13}, since information arriving on
these days should have already been reﬂected in the value of Rw−1; and (3) the coeﬃcients
β1j should all be the same for j ∈ {4,5,6,7,8}, since these are just alternative estimates
of the single number θ1; likewise the β2j should all equal θ2 and the β3j should all equal
θ3 for j ∈ {4,5,6,7,8}. Formal tests of these hypotheses all turn out to be accepted7
. One might see a suggestion in Figure 3 that β14 and β24 are smaller than the others,
which would be consistent with the claim that a fraction of the banks are reporting values
set on Friday. That hypothesis would also imply a nonzero value for β19 and β29, which
7 A joint test of hypotheses (1) and (2) produces an F(24,879) statistic of 0.94 (p value of 0.55). A test
of hypothesis (3) results in F(36,879) = 1.32 (p = 0.10).
15again is suggested by the ﬁgure at least for β29. But while that alternative hypothesis is
quite plausible and hinted at by the point estimates, the evidence for it is not statistically
signiﬁcant. Furthermore, any modiﬁcation of the statement of the results in this direction
would lend even more credence to the claim that (4) is the correct theoretical framework for
predicting how daily mortgage rates would behave if we had accurate daily data available.
For purposes of having a formal null hypothesis to test, I will maintain the view that ∆Rw
can be interpreted as the Monday-to-Monday change in an implicit daily mortgage series.
Note further that the curvature coeﬃcients β3j do not appear to contributing anything
for any j, a hypothesis one readily accepts with an F(13,879) statistic of 0.78 (p value of
0.68).
Coeﬃcient estimates that result from imposing hypotheses (1) and (2) above, that is,
from estimation of










are reported in the ﬁrst 5 rows of Table 2. It is natural to interpret the values ˆ β1j as 5
independent estimates of θ1. These estimates all suggest a value of θ1 around 0.5, meaning
that if something causes market participates to raise their estimate of the near-term level
of the fed funds rate by 10 basis points, the 30-year mortgage rate would go up by 5 basis
points. The slope coeﬃcients ˆ β2j in (7) likewise give 5 independent estimates of θ2,e a c ho f
which suggests a value for θ2 around 1.3, meaning if the rate at which the Fed is expected
to be raising interest rates goes up by 10 basis points per month, the mortgage rate would
rise by 13 basis points.
16The theoretical framework and statistical acceptance of hypothesis (3) above imply that
we could better estimate θ1 and θ2 by combining the information across days of the week,










as in row (6) of Table 2. The R2 of the above regression is 0.35, meaning that about a
third of the variance of weekly changes in mortgage rates is accountable by new information
about what the federal funds rate is likely to be over the next few months.
Stretching the maintained assumption that daily changes in the risk premium are negligi-
ble on into months may be questionable, but it is interesting to predict what should happen
over longer intervals again under the stark hypothesis that (4) is exactly true. We can
construct an artiﬁcial monthly series, properly and consistently aggregated, as follows. Let
˜ Rm1 be the mortgage rate for the last week whose release date falls within month m. Let
˜ Rm2 be the mortgage rate for the week before that (the next-to-last week of the month), and
so on. Our focus will be on the value of ˜ Rm1 − ˜ Rm5, which corresponds to the cumulative
change in the mortgage over the last four weeks of month m. If the weekly series Rw were a
martingale, then the monthly series ˜ Rm1− ˜ Rm5 would be uncorrelated with ˜ Rm−1,1− ˜ Rm−1,5.
Let ˜ `m1 denote the cumulative change in the expected level of the fed funds rate over the





Let ˜ `m2 denote the cumulative level change for the week before that, and let ˜ smk denote
analogous cumulative slope changes for various weeks of month m. The weekly martingale
17hypothesis would then imply that in the monthly regression,
˜ Rm1 − ˜ Rm5 =˜ c +
4 X
k=1
(˜ β1k˜ `mk + ˜ β2k˜ smk)+˜ εm
the error ˜ εm should again be serially uncorrelated and the coeﬃcients ˜ β1k would give us 4
independent estimates of the same structural coeﬃcient θ1 hypothesized to be governing the
underlying latent daily relation; ˜ β2k likewise give us 4 estimates of θ2. These estimates
are reported in rows (7)-(10) of Table 2. The estimates for θ1 tend to be a little smaller
and those for θ2 a little bigger than those obtained from the original weekly data, though
conﬁdence intervals for each separate estimate easily include the predicted value. Again we
accept the hypothesis (F(6,203) = 0.97,p=0 .45)t h a tt h ec o e ﬃcients ˜ β1k are all the same,
as are the ˜ β2k. Imposing this restriction gives yet another new pair of estimates in row (11)
of Table 2 that are quite consistent with all the others that have been obtained.
3.4 Invariance of the correlations.
The estimates presented so far simply summarize the comovement between fed funds futures
and 30-year mortgage rates, without attempting to identify whether mortgage rates are
responding to news about the Fed or whether both the Fed and mortgage rates are responding
to general news about the economy. In this section we explore how these correlations diﬀer
as a function of the source of news that appears to be hitting the market.
The ﬁrst way I addressed this was by singling out those days for which Gürkaynak, Sack,
and Swanson (2005b) identiﬁed monetary policy statements to be the key factor driving
changes in the fed funds futures markets. There are 139 such days (all between 1990 and
182005) within the sample. Let a
[MP]
w1 = 1 if the day on which Rw would usually be reported
happened also to be a day on which Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson determined that a major
policy announcement was issued, with a
[MP]
w1 otherwise deﬁned to be zero. Let a
[MP]
w2 = 1
if a policy announcement occurred on the previous day, and so on. I reproduced (7) using
only fed funds futures changes on days for which a
[MP]
wj = 1:

















The estimated values for β
[MP]
kj are reported in rows (12) through (16) of Table 2. This
is asking a lot of the data, since there there are typically only 28 observations relevant for
estimating a given coeﬃcient β
[MP]
ij , a n dt h i si sr e ﬂected in large standard errors.8 Even so,
the level coeﬃcients on the third and ﬁfth day of the week are each statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, all 10 estimated coeﬃcients are positive, and all are within the range,
given the standard errors, of values that would be expected if they were providing estimates
of the same values θ1 and θ2 identiﬁed in earlier rows in the table. One can formally test
that equivalence by testing H0: λ
[MP]
kj =0 ,j=4 ,...,8, k = 1,2 in
























This hypothesis is accepted (F(10,898) = 1.61,p=0 .10).
One can get considerably more power by grouping the ﬁve days together, and indeed one








2 for j =4 ,...,8 in (9) (F(8,908) =
8 The deterioration in standard errors between rows (1)-(5) and (12)-(16) is not as great as one might
have expected given the huge reduction in the number of useful observations because a disproportionately
large share of the variance of `wj and swj is accounted for by those days for which a
[MP]
wj is nonzero.






















then have much more accuracy, and are extremely close to those obtained from the full
sample, as seen in row (17) of Table 2.
I found similar results using only data from days on which other particular announcements
are made. For example, let a
[CU]
wj = 1 if a capacity utilization ﬁg u r ew a sr e l e a s e do nd a y
j of week w, with a
[CU]
wj = 1 otherwise.9 Although these release dates do not allow one
to estimate each individual day eﬀect, one can calculate eﬀects cumulating over the week,
replacing a
[MP]
wj in (11) with a
[CU]
wj . Note that such an estimate makes no use of changes
in fed funds futures on any day other than those on which capacity utilization data are
released, and one would expect that this particular news was a key factor accounting for the
variation in `wj and swj on these days. Yet we ﬁnd in row 1 of Table 3 that the response of
mortgage rates to new information about near-term fed funds rates is virtually the same as
any of the estimates from Table 2, and again we formally accept the hypothesis that capacity





for [q]=[ CU] in




















is readily accepted (F(2,906) = 0.01,p=0 .99). T h es a m ei st r u ei fw eo n l yu s et h o s ed a y s
on which unemployment or the consumer price index are released (see Table 3). Release of
9 These dates were taken from MMS data kindly provided me by Andra Ghent.
20the consumer conﬁdence numbers does not seem to have much eﬀect on fed funds futures,
so the standard errors if we were forced to rely on only these days are quite big (row 4),
though again the estimates using only these days are statistically consistent with those for
all other days.
We are now in a position to draw the following conclusions. Suppose we are given
information that the Federal Reserve is going to be setting a level for the fed funds rate over
the next several months that is 10 basis points higher than we had previously anticipated.
We would then expect to see an upward revision in the 30-year mortgage rate of 5 basis
points. Likewise, news that causes us to revise upward by 10 basis points per month the
rate at which the Fed is going to be raising the fed funds rate over the next several months
would lead us to expect a 13-basis-point increase in the mortgage rate. And we would not
particularly care whether the news that caused us to change our anticipations of the fed
funds rate was based on an announcement made by the Fed or release of new information
about output, employment, or inﬂation— if we change our expectation of what the Fed is
going to do for whatever reason, the data suggest a similar change in the mortgage rate.
The results further imply that any changes in Fed policy will show up in mortgage rates
the instant that they become anticipated by markets, and that the only way the Fed could
change mortgage rates is by doing something unanticipated by the market.
Given these results, suppose that the Fed Chair were then to ask us, What do you expect
to happen to mortgage rates if I raise the level of the fed funds rate by 10 basis points? A
reasonable answer to give would be, we expect the mortgage rate to rise by 5 basis points.
21In the following section, we extend these results to predicting the consequences for the
number of new homes sold.
4N e w h o m e s a l e s .
4.1 Mortgage rates and new home sales.
The primary data on home sales used here are the seasonally unadjusted monthly values for
the number of new homes sold, as reported by the Census Bureau and obtained from the
Webstract database (series HZNS). Let hm denote 100 times the natural logarithm of this
series for month m, ym denote the rate of growth of real GDP for the most recently completed
quarter prior to month m,a n d∆ ˜ Rmj the change in the weekly mortgage rate for the jth
most recent week counting backwards from the last week of month m. For example, for
m corresponding to June 2006, ∆ ˜ Rm1 is the diﬀerence between the mortgage rate reported
on Thursday, June 29, 2006 and that for June 22, while ∆ ˜ Rm6 is the change between May
18 and May 25. I explored a regression of hm (for m = February 1989 to June 2006) on
seasonal dummies for each of the 12 months, 5 of its own lags, a linear time trend, the prior







γ1jhm−j + γ21m + γ22ym +
30 X
j=1
γ3j∆ ˜ Rmj + εm (12)
where dm1 = 1 if month m is January and zero otherwise. The estimated coeﬃcients on the
variables other than the lagged mortgage rates are reported in Table 4. For this estimation,
the sample size is 209 months and the R2 is 0.97.
New home sales are highly seasonal, with most sales coming in the spring and summer.
22Regression (12) models home sales as stationary around monthly dummies and time trend,
with the sum of lag coeﬃcients coming to 0.83. Additional lags of home sales or GDP
growth, or measures of inﬂation based on the one-quarter or 12-month change in the personal
consumption expenditures deﬂator, do not enter statistically signiﬁcantly.
The coeﬃcients on weekly mortgage rates for this regression, along with 95% conﬁdence
intervals, are plotted in the top panel of Figure 4. Recalling that these regressors ∆ ˜ Rmj are
essentially independent of each other, the large block of coeﬃcients with t-statistics around
-2 for lags 6 through 23 is extremely statistically signiﬁcant. Nor are these long lags an
artifact of using the lagged changes rather than levels of mortgage rates as explanatory
variables— if one adds the current level of the mortgage rate or the past log level of GDP
to the above regression, the new coeﬃcients on levels are statistically insigniﬁcant and the
long lags on ∆ ˜ Rmj remain. The regression indicates that, if your goal is to forecast home
sales, it pays to look not just at seasonals, GDP growth, trend, and lags of home sales, but
also what the mortgage rates have been every week for the last 6 months.
4.2 Interpreting the lags.
What could account for such long lags? One’s ﬁr s tg u e s sm i g h tb ed e l a y sb e t w e e nt h e
signing of a contract and the completion of escrow, but that can not explain the ﬁndings
here, since the Census counts a home as being sold on the date the contract is signed rather
than the date of escrow. A second, more promising hypothesis is that for many people,
there is a substantial lag between the time at which they decide to buy a home and the time
at which they ﬁnd the particular home they want and are able to buy.
23The National Association of Realtors conducts a survey of individuals who buy a home,
asking, “How long did you actively search before you located the home you eventually
purchased?” The top panel of Figure 5 plots the cross-section distribution of search times
from their 2005 Proﬁle of Home Buyers and Sellers.10 There is clear measurement error in
these data, with respondents much more likely to report multiples of 4 weeks and considerable
clumping at 52-week and more-than-99-week searches. Insofar as these simply represent
rounding of the original true values, ignoring this clumping is unlikely to matter for the
statistics reported below, which make no eﬀort to model these reporting regularities.
A Weibull density is often used to describe a cross-section distribution of search times.
Let j denote the number of weeks a household says it spent searching, k the shape parameter,













Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters for the search distribution based on the
cross-section data11 are reported in the ﬁrst panel of Table 5. These estimates imply that
households spent an average of 14.9 weeks searching before purchasing a home.
Consider the implications for the time series regressions if there is a cross-sectional hetero-
geneity in search times represented by (13). Let ˜ Smj denote the total number of households
searching for a home as of the jth week counting backward from the end of month m and
˜ Hmj the actual number of houses sold that week. Suppose that the log of the number of
10 I am grateful to NAR for providing me with this data.
11 I associated a reported search time of j weeks with the midpoint between j and j +1 in order to allow
evaluation of (13) for a search time of j =0weeks when k<1.





in which α∗ gives the proportionate decrease in house-searchers resulting from a 1-basis-
point increase in the mortgage rate. If f(j;k,λ) of these searchers would have otherwise




∗ ˜ Smjf(j;k,λ). (14)
If month mconsisted of exactly 4 weeks, then the change in Hm,t h el e v e lo fm o n t hm’s










Let ς denote the average ratio of searchers to monthly sales and approximate ˜ Smj/Hm ' ς.




where α = 100α∗ς, that is, α measures the decrease in home searchers as a percent of monthly
sales that results from a 1-basis-point increase in the mortgage rate.
These considerations suggest an approach similar to that in Jung (2006), who related the
time-series delays in the impulse-response function between monthly fed funds rate innova-
tions and subsequent investment spending to the distribution across investment projects in
25the time required for completion as estimated from cross-section surveys. Here, I propose







γ1jhm−j + γ21m + γ22ym + α
30 X
j=1
gW(j;k,λ)∆ ˜ Rmj + εm. (15)
This also will be recognized as an alternative strategy to those proposed by Ghysels, Santa-
Clara, and Valkanov (2004) for selecting a parsimonious representation of the dynamics
implied by a regression such as (12).






2,σ)0 was then estimated by maximum likeli-
hood assuming εm ∼ N(0,σ2), or equivalently by nonlinear least squares. Noting that (15)
is essentially a restricted version12 of (12), we can test the appropriateness of this speciﬁca-
tion with a likelihood ratio test, whose χ2(27) statistic has a p-value of 0.09. The resulting
estimates of α,k,and λ are reported in the second panel of Table 5. If for illustration 1/5
of the people searching succeed in buying a home each month (ς =5 ) , then the estimate
ˆ α = −0.2 would imply that 100α∗ = −0.04, meaning that a 100-basis-point increase in the
mortgage rate leads to a 4% reduction in the number of people who are trying to purchase
a new home. The values of k and λ estimated from the time-series relation imply a mean
search time of 13.4 weeks, quite similar to the value of 14.9 weeks obtained from the cross-
section estimates in panel 1. Restricting the coeﬃcients in this way tremendously improves
the precision of the estimated eﬀect of mortgage rates on new home sales, whose coeﬃcient
α now has a t statistic of -5.5.
12 I am ignoring here the fact that (15) includes coeﬃcients on ∆ ˜ Rmj for j>30 w h i c ha r en o ti n( 1 2 ) .
This is appropriate since these predicted values are less than 10−3 in absolute value.
26The restricted values for the coeﬃcients on lagged mortgage rates are plotted in the
second panel of Figure 4. The distribution implies that consumers are distributed across
ab r o a dr a n g eo fs e a r c ht i m e s . A l t h o u g ho n ec a ns a yw i t hag o o dd e a lo fc o n ﬁdence that
mortgage rates have a big eﬀect on home sales and that this eﬀect is broadly spread out
o v e ra1 -t o6 - m o n t hi n t e r v a l ,a l t e r n a t i v es p e c i ﬁcations of the distribution would also ﬁt
the data. For example, the third panel of Figure 4 reports the results of assuming simply






with the single regressor ˜ Rm6 − ˜ Rm,24, i.e., the cumulative
change in the mortgage rate between 24 and 6 weeks earlier. This speciﬁcation uses 2 fewer
parameters (if one ignores the implicit parameter choice of having used 6 and 24 as endpoints
of the distribution) than (15), and achieves a value for the log likelihood that is only 0.4
below that of (15). I nonetheless ﬁnd (15) a slightly more attractive formulation, since it
seems unlikely that the eﬀect would be literally zero for j<6 or > 23, and since it oﬀers a
cleaner treatment of exactly what has been estimated from the data.
Although the mean lag of the distributions implied by the estimates in panel 1 and panel
2 of Table 5 are similar, the shapes (compared in the second and third panels of Figure
5) are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. The time-series relations imply an increasing
hazard rate (k>1) while the cross-section hazard rate is nearly constant. There are two
reasons why we might expect these distributions to be diﬀerent. First, the cross-section
distribution includes a number of households with very long search times of 1 or 2 years,
for which it seems implausible that the mortgage rate prevailing 1 or 2 years previous is a
27key determinative factor. If these long-time searchers do not play a material role in the
time-series lags, one would expect the mean delay as estimated by the time-series regression
to be shorter than that from the cross-sectional analysis. Second, following Reis (2006),
it seems natural to posit that there is some heterogeneity across households in the time
required to receive and process information about changes in mortgage rates, introducing a
heterogeneous delay between the time at which the mortgage rate changes and the time at
which a household initiates or abandons a search for a new home. This factor would cause
the mean lag from the cross-section estimates to be greater than that from the time-series
analysis. The combined eﬀect of the two factors could account for why the two distributions
have the same mean, with the time-series distribution having less mass at very short or very
long delays.
4.3 Linking home sales to monetary policy.
We motivated equation (12) as simply a forecasting regression, though the negative coef-
ﬁcients on lagged mortgage rates suggest it is primarily summarizing demand eﬀects, and
the speciﬁc restriction on those lags imposed in (15) was motivated by interpretation as a
demand curve. We now propose that the inference from this restricted forecasting equation
can be combined with the parameters from the preceding section to answer the question,
What should the Federal Reserve expect to happen to new home sales if it raises the fed
funds rate more than expected?
As support for this interpretation, we might ﬁrst seek to isolate the eﬀect on new home
sales of that component of mortgage rate changes that are associated statistically with
28innovations in the fed funds rate by estimating equation (12) by 2SLS, using as instruments
{˜ `mk, ˜ smk}30
k=1, where as in (8) ˜ `mk is the cumulative innovations in the level in the kth week
counting backward from the last week of month m. The non-mortgage-rate regressors in (12)
were also used as instruments. The resulting 2SLS estimates of the coeﬃcients on lagged
mortgage rates are plotted in the last panel of Figure 4, along with 95% conﬁdence intervals.
The 2SLS estimates are less precise than the OLS estimates in the top panel, though two of
the coeﬃcients (lags 8 and 16) individually are statistically signiﬁcant, and the broad pattern
of negative coeﬃcients between lags 6 and 21 is reproduced by the 2SLS estimates. Since
there are two instruments (level and slope) for each mortgage rate, Hansen’s J statistic (e.g.,
Hamilton, 1994, p. 421) can be used to test for the validity of the instruments. Alternatively,
one can use the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test13 for whether the OLS and 2SLS estimates are the
same, or simply test whether {˜ `mk,˜ smk}30
k=1 should appear as additional OLS regressors in
(12). As reported in the ﬁrst row of Table 6, our results pass all three of these speciﬁcation
tests— one accepts the hypothesis that the predicted consequences for home sales of fed funds
innovations are exactly those anticipated on the basis of the eﬀect of those innovations on
mortgage rates, and that the fed funds rate has no eﬀect on new home sales other than that
operating through changes in the mortgage rate.
One can obtain both more precise estimates and more powerful tests if we treat the
values of k =3 .24 and λ = 14.97 as known and then use this same set of 79 instruments
13 This is found by ﬁrst regressing each ∆ ˜ Rmj on the full set of instruments, adding these 30 residuals
to (12), and then calculating the usual OLS F test for whether these 30 new coeﬃcients are all zero. See
equation (6) in Nakamura and Nakamura (1981).
29to estimate the 20 parameters in (15) by 2SLS. The resulting estimate of ˆ α2SLS = −0.19
turns out to be virtually identical to the value ˆ αMLE = −0.20 reported in Table 5, and all 3
speciﬁcation tests lead to acceptance of the null hypothesis that 30 weeks of lagged fed funds
innovations contribute nothing to predicting new home sales beyond that captured by the
single variable Qm =
P30
j=1 gW(j;k,λ)∆ ˜ Rmj, and that the predictive consequences for new
home sales of that portion of movements in Qm that could be explained statistically by fed
funds innovations are identical to those inferred from an OLS regression on the restricted
mortgage rate changes alone.
It is also interesting to use as instruments only fed funds innovations on days of sig-
niﬁcant monetary policy announcements, namely use as instruments for Qm the values
{˜ `
[MP]
mk , ˜ s
[MP]
mk }30






w∗(m)−k+1,.j`w∗(m)−k+1,j. Row 3 of Table
6 shows that we accept the hypothesis that the eﬀects on new home sales of fed funds futures
changes on days of monetary policy announcements are the same as those we would infer
from the original forecasting equation (15).
It is also possible to examine the relation between new home sales and daily changes
in fed funds futures. Let `∗
mj denote the change in the level of the fed funds futures on
the jth business day counting backwards from the last day of month m and let s∗
mj denote
the change in the slope on that day. Consider the consequences of replacing (15) with a



















mj + εm (16)





The earlier analysis allows us to predict what we should ﬁnd from estimation of (16).
The average week between January 1989 and June 2006 contained 4.8 business days. If
the combined information-processing and search delays measured in weeks are distributed
across households with a W(kW,λW) distribution, and if these delays are evenly distributed
across business days within a given week, then the delays measured in days should have
a W(kD,λD) distribution with the same shape parameter (kD = kW) a n dt r a n s l a t e ds c a l e
(λD =4 .8λW). From the estimates in Section 3, we would expect a 1-basis-point increase in
`∗
mj to translate into 0.5-basis-point increase in the mortgage rate quoted that day, implying
α` =0 .5αW, while a 1-basis-point increase in s∗
mj would raise the mortgage rate by 1.3
b a s i sp o i n t s( αs = 1.3αW). This leads to predicted values for the coeﬃcients reported in
the third panel of Table 5, which are compared with those obtained by direct maximum
likelihood estimation of (16). The standard errors are fairly big, and the level coeﬃcient is
not statistically signiﬁcant. However, given the estimation uncertainty, the parameters are
in the range of what we had expected, and a likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that
the restrictions on kD,λD,αL, and αS are all correct yields a χ2(4) statistic of 8.31 (p-value
31= 0.08), leading to acceptance of the null hypothesis. The search- and processing-time
distribution implied by the daily time-series regression is converted back into units of weeks
and plotted for comparison with those obtained by the other methods in the bottom panel
of Figure 5.
4.4 Summarizing the dynamic consequences of monetary policy.
We are now in a position to answer the main question posed by this paper: If the Fed were to
change its target for the fed funds rate, what would we expect to happen to new home sales?
If the change were anticipated, the framework above implies there would be no eﬀect. If the
change is unanticipated, the dynamic consequences for new home sales would be identical
regardless of the nature and timing of the change— as soon as any change is anticipated, that
will translate into an immediate one-time shift in the mortgage rate, and this change will
then feed into future home sales through the dynamics governed by the search parameters
k and λ.
We can calculate the analog of a traditional impulse-response function as follows. I illus-
trate the implications for a change in ˜ Rm2, the next-to-last week of month m. The framework
above implies ∂ ˜ Hm2/∂ ˜ Rm2 = α∗ ˜ Sm2f(1;kW,λW) and ∂ ˜ Hm1/∂ ˜ Rm2 = α∗ ˜ Sm2f(2;kW,λW). If,
for illustration, the following month m + 1 has 4 weeks, then for home sales in each of that
month’s 4 weeks ( ˜ Hm+1,j for j =4 ,3,2,1) there is both the direct eﬀect α∗ ˜ Sm2f(7−j;kW,λW)
and the indirect eﬀect, the latter arising through the coeﬃcient γ11 in (15) and resulting



















and evaluating the derivative ∂ logHm+1/logHm = γ11 at Hm+1 = Hm,
∂( ˜ Hm+1,4 + ˜ Hm+1,3 + ˜ Hm+1,2 + ˜ Hm+1,1)
∂Hm
= γ11. (18)




∗ ˜ Sm2f(7 − j;kW,λW)+( γ11/4)[α
∗ ˜ Sm2f(1;kW,λW)+α
∗ ˜ Sm2f(2;kW,λW)]
for j = 1,2,3,4. One can iterate into future weeks in this fashion, analogous to calculating
a standard impulse-response function, except that the calculations depend on the number of
weeks comprising each month during the process. To summarize the typical response lag, I
performed the above calculations starting for every week from October 7, 1988 to May 20,
2004. The average of these functions across all weeks is plotted in Figure 6, standardized
for a change in mortgage rates of 10 basis points. This calculation implies that the maximal
consequences of an increase in mortgage rates is not observed until 15 weeks later, at which
time we would predict new home sales to be 1.04 basis points lower if there is a 10-basis-point
increase in mortgage rates today.
As a result of the way the mortgage rate has been observed to respond to news, the
dynamic consequences of any unanticipated change in Fed policy have exactly the same
33shape as the curve in Figure 6. For example, Figure 6 could equally well be described as
the dynamic response of new home sales to a 20-basis-point increase in the level of the fed
funds term structure, or also as the response to a 10/1.3 = 7.7-basis-point increase in its
slope.
Given the long lags between a change in policy and the eﬀects on the economy, we
are often in a situation where some monetary easing has followed a period of tightness,
and policy makers would like to know, When will the recent easing start to counteract the
previous tightening? The framework here provides us with a concrete basis for answering
such questions. Let H(d) denote the number of homes sold and S(d) the number of people














' 20.9(0.5)αWf(j + 1;kW,λW)
with 20.9 business days in a month. This gives us a way to summarize on a daily basis
the implications for today’s home sales of previous unanticipated monetary policy moves
through calculation of





f(j − 0.5;kD,λD)`(d − j + 1)+1.3
125 X
j=1




I calculated the value of this number for every day d i nt h es a m p l eu s i n gαW = −0.20,
kD =3 .24,a n dλD =7 1.85. This index is characterized by an average value of zero by
34construction, given that the surprises `(d) and s(d) have mean zero. A negative value
means that, on balance over the last half year, the Fed has surprised the market by being
more contractionary at the 1-3 month horizon than markets had anticipated. The units
of this index are in terms of the consequences that historical fed funds rate surprises are
imputed to be having (in percentage terms) for current home sales. For example, a value of
ξ(d)=−5 means that the home sales on day d are expected to be 5% lower than one would
have predicted had the Fed behaved exactly as markets had been anticipating over the prior
6m o n t h s .
The value of this index is plotted in Figure 7. It is rarely observed to exceed 5%
in absolute value, with the most signiﬁcant historical contractions appearing prior to the
recession of 1990, the economic slowdown of 1994, and the recession of 2001. The most recent
episode of Fed tightening in fact did not surprise the markets very much, and accordingly
is not regarded as that unusual by this metric. Instead, the dominant feature of Fed policy
during the last decade is judged to be the aggressively expansionary policy in 2001-2002.
4.5 Application: monetary policy and the summer of 2006.
Figure 8 displays post-sample data14 on the changing predictions for the August, September,
and October fed funds futures contracts during the summer of 2006. In early summer,
traders were anticipating a hike from the then-prevailing 5.25% up to 5.5% by the fall.
During July, the market changed this assessment, becoming persuaded (correctly, as it turned
14 Fed funds futures data subsequent to June 30, 2006 were downloaded from the now-defunct website
http://www.spotmarketplace.com/futures/prices/ and represent closing rather than settlement prices. Note
that these post-June data were not used in any of the preceding statistical analysis.
35out) by the end of August that no rate changes would be forthcoming.
These changing expectations produced changes in both the level and the slope of near-
term fed funds futures. According to the framework presented in Section 3, the fact that
the Fed ended up choosing a lower target and slower rate of increase for August through
October than the market had been anticipating as of the start of July would be expected to
bring a reduction in the 30-year mortgage rate. The upper solid line in Figure 9 summarizes
this prediction, by taking (1/2) of the cumulative change from July 3 through the indicated
date in the 1-month-ahead fed funds rate, and adding it to 1.3 times the cumulative change
in the 2-month-ahead minus the 1-month-ahead rate. The lower dashed line indicates the
actual cumulative change in the mortgage rate. About a third of the 32-basis-point decline
in the mortgage rate during July and August could be attributed to the fact that lenders
became persuaded that the Fed was going to be less restrictive in August through October
than the market had previously been anticipating.
One important practical challenge for the Fed is making decisions given the long delays
between changes in policy and the eﬀects on variables such as home sales. An unantici-
pated monetary policy stimulus, as measured by a sequence of negative values for `(d) and
s(d), began July 13 . However, according to the estimates presented here, the maximal
eﬀects of this stimulus would not be expected until October, and what happened during
the summer and fall of 2006 would be determined in part by the stance of the Fed prior to
June. The index proposed in (19) oﬀers one convenient tool for summarizing the combined
consequences of current easing with previous tightening. The subsequent values for this
36index, plotted in the left half of Figure 10, show that, even though the Fed surprised the
market with a more expansionary stance beginning July 13, the cumulative implications of
that posture combined with previous tightening in fact became increasingly contractionary
through August 23, reﬂecting the delayed eﬀect of the unanticipated contraction prior to
June 30. The cumulative consequences started to become slightly less contractionary sub-
sequent to August 23, with the turning point reached on October 12, 2006, after which the
net Fed contribution was one of stimulus rather than contraction.
A calculation that is easy to perform is to project the index (19) forward under the
assumption that there are no subsequent surprises in monetary policy, i.e., by setting future
values of `(d) and s(d) to zero. The resulting series is displayed in the right half of Figure
10. This reveals that the eﬀects of previous monetary policy would have been expected to
grow increasingly expansionary through the end of November.
5 Conclusions.
The current mortgage rate reﬂects a rational anticipation of all future Fed policy actions. In
order to change the mortgage rate, the Fed must do something other than what the market
anticipated, and any change in Fed policy seems to show up in mortgage rates as soon as
the market anticipates it. An unanticipated 10-basis-point increase in the level of the term
structure of near-term expected fed funds rates raises the mortgage rate by 5 basis points.
An unanticipated 10-basis-point increase in the slope raises the mortgage rate by 13 basis
points.
37The consequences of such changes do not have their peak eﬀect on new home sales until
15 weeks after mortgage rates go up. This delay might be attributed to heterogeneity
across households in the time required to learn about changes in mortgage rates and to buy
a new home. These dynamic relations, which have been directly estimated in detail here
using daily and weekly time-series data, are claimed to account for some of the long lags
found in more traditional analysis using time-aggregated monthly data. The framework
also enables us to summarize on a daily or even minute-by-minute basis, if desired, the
cumulative consequences of recent innovations in Fed policy or hypothetical future scenario
as of any particular historical moment.
38Appendix
This appendix derives the approximate martingale property for a long-term bond sampled
at high frequencies.
Consider a mortgage that is acquired on day d and requires the household to make a
ﬁxed nominal payment A(d) on the ﬁrst day of each month for the next 30 years (or for
M∗ = 360 months). If V (d) denotes the total amount borrowed on day d,t h e nf o rt h e
pricing kernel λs(d) relating a payment made on the ﬁrst day of the sth following month to





The terms of such a loan are often quoted in terms of the ﬁxed mortgage interest rate R(d)
that satisﬁes
V (d)=vd[R(d)]A(d) (21)





If the previous day falls within the same month (m∗(d)=m∗(d − 1)), then





















39where q(d) denotes the one-day discount factor, e.g.,
q(d)=
βU0(c(d))/P(d)
U0(c(d − 1))/P(d − 1)
' 1.
If uncertainty about the one-day discount factor relating today with tomorrow is negligible
as of day d − 1,t h e n( 2 3 )i m p l i e s




Furthermore, the function vd−1(R) diﬀers from vd(R) by one-day’s discounting, so approxi-
mately
vd−1(R) ' [Ed−1q(d)]vd(R). (25)
Equations (24) and (25) imply




Subtracting (26) from (22),
vd(R(d)) − vd(R(d − 1)) '
M∗ X
s=1
(Ed − Ed−1)λs(d). (27)
If we approximated vd(R) with a linear function (vd(R) ' v0+v1R), then (27) implies that
daily changes in the quoted mortgage rate R(d) should be very diﬃcult to forecast, reﬂecting
primarily new information about the discount factor relevant for the next 30 years:






The above argument exploited the fact that, as one moves from day d − 1 to day d,t h e
days on which payment is made (the ﬁrst day of each of the following months) remain ﬁxed.
40If one evaluates the expression on the last day of a month, there is an added diﬀerence in
that one drops the near-term payment and adds another at the very end. Again if the term
of the mortgage is very long and discount rates are stationary, this adjustment should make
only a modest diﬀerence in the calculation.
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Tests of null hypothesis that indicated variables are of no use in predicting weekly 
changes in mortgage rate 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  F tests 
 
                      Variables          F statistic  p value 
  
 
More weekly lags 
6
4 } { = − ∆ j j w R      F(3,915) = 0.02   0.997   
Monthly lags 
6
1 1 ) ( ) ( }
~ ~
{ * * = − − − − j j w m j w m R R    F(6,912) = 0.48        0.82    
 
  t tests 
 
                      Variable                coefficient     (standard error)      p value
  
 
10-year minus 5-year Treasury yield        0.005    (0.009)        0.60 
            
5-year minus 2-year Treasury yield      -0.004     (0.006)        0.51  
 
2-year minus 1-year Treasury yield      -0.016     (0.012)        0.18 
 
1-year minus 6-month Treasury yield     -0.018      (0.019)        0.36 
 
Baa minus 10-year Treasury yield       0.001      (0.006)        0.85 
 
12-month job growth as currently reported   0.26       (0.25)        0.29 
    for period ending previous month 
 
12-month job growth as reported at the time    0.21       (0.27)        0.44 
    for most recent period              
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes. All entries refer to t or F test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient vectorγ is 
zero in the regression 
  w w
j






for  w x  the indicated variable or variables.  In row 2,  ) (
* w m refers to the month in which 




w m R to the average value for  w R across all the weeks of the month in 
which week w occurs.  Note that  m R
~ is identical to the monthly mortgage series reported 
by the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 45 
Table 2 
 
Coefficients relating change in mortgage rate to innovation in level or slope 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Regression                       Explanatory    ----Effects of level----     ----Effects of slope---- 
description                       variable           Symbol    Coefficient    Symbol   Coefficient 
                                                                                    (std error)                     (std error)                  
 
weekly change ∆Rw on each day’s innovation   
 
(1)                                     1st day of week     Aw8               0.43                      s w8           1.16 
                                                                                     (0.12)                                   (0.22) 
(2)                                     2nd day of week    Aw7               0.59                      s w7           1.06 
                                                                                     (0.13)                                   (0.23) 
(3)                                     3rd day of week     Aw6               0.65                     s w6           1.37 
                                                                                     (0.08)                                   (0.18) 
(4)                                     4th day of week     Aw5               0.70                     s w5           1.56 
                                                                                     (0.11)                                   (0.20) 
(5)                                     5th day of week     Aw4               0.21                     s w4           1.14 
                                                                                     (0.10)                                   (0.20) 
 
weekly change ∆Rw on sum of innovations for all 5 days of week 
 
(6)                                                          Aw4 + … + Aw8   0.53           s w4 + … + s w8   1.33  
                                                                                     (0.04)                                  (0.10) 
 
 change in last 4 weeks of month  )
~ ~
( 5 1 m m R R −  on each week’s cumulative innovations   
 
(7)                                    last week of month      1
~
m A     0.14                    1
~
m s        1.07 
                                                                                     (0.22)                             (0.44) 
(8)                                    week before that          2
~
m A     0.64                    2
~
m s        1.35 
                                                                                     (0.18)                             (0.43) 
(9)                                    week before that          3
~
m A     0.30                    3
~
m s        1.96 
                                                                                     (0.16)                             (0.42) 
(10)                                  week before that          4
~
m A     0.40                    4
~
m s        1.64 
                                                                                     (0.20)                             (0.39) 46 
 
change in last 4 weeks of month  )
~ ~
( 5 1 m m R R −  on sum of 4 weeks’ cumulative innovations 
 




m m A A + +       0.41      4 1
~ ... ~
m m s s + +       1.53  
                                                                                      (0.09)                            (0.18) 
 
weekly change ∆Rw on innovations for only monetary policy announcement days   
 








w s a     1.31 
                                                                                       (0.28)                                    (0.54) 








w s a     1.93 
                                                                                       (0.86)                                    (8.11) 








w s a     0.79 
                                                                                       (0.23)                                     (1.30) 








w s a      3.53 
                                                                                       (0.26)                                     (2.45) 








w s a      1.05 
                                                                                       (0.21)                                     (0.93) 
 
weekly change ∆Rw on sum of innovations for only monetary policy announcement days 
















w s a s a + +"  1.49  
                                                                                        (0.11)                                    (0.39)   47 
Table 3 
 
Coefficients relating weekly change in mortgage rates to change in level and slope on the 
day that news of the indicated type is released, along with F tests of the null hypothesis 
that these coefficients are the same as those for all other days 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
    level    slope 
News release (q)      
] [
1 ˆ q θ       
] [
2 ˆ q θ    F test  p value 
--------------------                      ------         -------         ------         --------- 
 
(1)  Capacity utilization    0.46     1.54    0.01   0.99     
    (0.25)    (0.59) 
 
(2)  Unemployment     0.84    1.54     1.80   0.17 
    (0.12)    (0.31) 
 
(3)  Consumer price index   0.83     1.59    1.61   0.20   
    (0.27)    (0.54) 
 
(4)  Consumer confidence   0.14     0.29    0.94   0.39 





1 ˆ q θ and 
] [































wj a  if news of type q is released on day j of week w and is zero otherwise.  F 








































j w j w s a a s R c R ε λ λ θ θ β + ∑ + ∑ ∑ + ∑ + + ∑ ∆ + = ∆
= = = = =
− A A  48 
Table 4 
 
Coefficients from regression of 100 times the log of seasonally unadjusted new home 
sales on 30 weekly lags of mortgage rate changes and other explanatory variables; 
(standard errors in parentheses). 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
dm1  January    46.0    hm-1   1st lag home sales   0.48 
   (14.9)       (0.08) 
  
dm2  February   60.5    hm-2   2nd lag home sales   0.15 
   (14.9)       (0.08) 
 
dm3  March   65.9    hm-3   3rd lag home sales   0.14 
   (15.2)       (0.08) 
 
dm4  April    52.7    hm-4   4th lag home sales  -0.10 
   (15.5)       (0.08) 
 
dm5  May    53.2    hm-5   5th lag home sales   0.17 
   (15.7)       (0.07) 
 
dm6  June    49.7    m   time trend    0.073 
   (15.9)       (0.023) 
 
dm7  July    46.2    ym   previous GDP growth   2.63 
   (16.0)         (1.02)   
    
dm8  August    46.4           
   (15.9) 
 
dm9  September   34.2    
   (15.8)        
 
dm,10  October   39.9     
   (15.6)        
 
dm,11  November   32.4    
   (15.5)        
 
dm,12  December   34.7    
   (15.2)        49 
Table 5 
 
Estimates of search distribution parameters from alternative sources. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
(1) Maximum likelihood estimation of cross-section distribution of reported time to 
search before buying new home. 
 
                                              coefficient        standard error     
  W k  shape                        0.972                (0.014) 
  W λ  scale                       14.70                  (0.276) 
  mean lag                       14.9 weeks 
  
(2) Maximum likelihood estimation of relation between new home sales and 30 most 
recent weekly changes in mortgage rates. 
 
                                              coefficient        standard error     
  W k  shape                        3.24                  (0.63) 
  W λ  scale                       14.97                  (1.01) 
  W α  mortgage effect       -0.20                  (0.036) 
  mean lag                       13.4 weeks 
 
 
(3) Maximum likelihood estimation of relation between new home sales and 125 most 
recent daily changes in level and slope of fed funds futures. 
 
                                              predicted value        MLE         standard error    
  D k  shape                        3.24                      2.74             (1.02)                                            
  D λ  scale                       71.85                    47.94             (8.39) 
  L α  level effect               -0.10                    -0.01            (0.06) 
   S α  slope effect               -0.26                   -0.39             (0.14) 
  mean lag                        64.4 days            42.6 days 50 
Table 6 
 
2SLS estimation of effects of mortgage rate on new home sales using fed-funds-based 
measures as instruments 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
mortgage                                      SLS 2 ˆ α           J stat            DWH            OLS F 
measure                instruments    (std err)      (p value)       (p value)       (p value) 
-----------              --------------     ----------      ---------          ---------          --------- 
    
                                                                       ) 30 (
2 χ        F(30,130)       F(60,100)  
(1) unrestricted      all weekly      -----           28.86             1.07                1.39                                                    
                               innovations                      (0.53)           (0.38)              (0.07)  
 
                                                                       ) 59 (
2 χ        F(1,188)       F(60,129)  
(2) restricted          all weekly        -0.19        74.14              0.19               1.40 
                               innovations      (0.05)       (0.09)            (0.66)            (0.06) 
 
                                                                        ) 59 (
2 χ        F(1,188)       F(60,129)  
(3) restricted          policy days       -0.27        65.89              1.37               1.22 
                               only                  (0.07)       (0.25)            (0.24)            (0.17) 
 
  51 
Figure 1. Response of industrial production (in percentage annual growth rate) to 25-
basis-point increase in fed funds rate for different Cholesky orderings. 
Fed funds first













































Figure 2. Forecast errors for predicting (1) fed funds using lagged variables and all other 
current variables in the VAR, (2) fed funds using the previous months’ 1-month futures 
contract, and (3) the 2-month-ahead futures rate using the previous months’ 3-month-
ahead futures rate. 
VAR residuals
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Figure 3. OLS coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for each day’s level, slope and 
curvature from regressions of ∆Rw on a constant, three of its own lagged values, and 
level, slope and curvature for preceding 13 days. 
Coefficients on level



























Figure 4. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals relating monthly home sales to 
mortgage changes at indicated lags. 
Unrestricted coefficients on lagged weekly mortgage changes








Coefficients predicted by Weibull distribution








Coefficients predicted by uniform distribution








Unrestricted coefficients from 2SLS









Figure 5. Top panel: sample histogram and MLE density-estimate based on cross-section 
distribution of time required (in weeks) to purchase a home based on National 
Association of Realtors’ 2005 Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers.  Second panel: density 
from top panel alone.  Third panel: density implied by Weibull parameters fit to time-
series relation between new home sales and lagged weekly changes in mortgage rates.  
Fourth panel: density implied by Weibull parameters fit to time-series relation between 
new home sales and lagged daily changes in fed funds level and slope. 
Distribution of search times







Density based on National Association of Realtors search time







Density based on new home sales response to lagged mortgage changes







Density based on new home sales response to lagged fed funds innovations








Figure 6. Average impulse-response function relating 10-basis-point increase in mortgage 
rate to 100 times the natural log of new home sales. 
% response of new home sales to 10 bp increase in mortgage rate
lag (in weeks)










Figure 7. Index summarizing the consequences for new home sales on day d (the variable 
on the horizontal axis) of the history of monetary policy innovations prior to and 
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Figure 8. Values for the fed funds rate for October (solid line), September (short-dashed 
line), and August (long-dashed line) 2006 as implied by fed funds futures contracts traded 
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Figure 9. Cumulative change (in basis points) in weekly mortgage rate between July 3, 
2006 and indicated date (dashed line) and cumulative change as predicted (solid line) by 
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Figure 10. Solid line: index summarizing cumulative consequences of monetary policy 
through day d on new home sales for day d; dashed line: index summarizing cumulative 
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